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Abstract 
 
Insider dealing has been unlawful in the UK since 1980 and market abuse, of which 
insider dealing is just one form, since 2000. It is from this time when the FSA was 
established and the creation of these as civil offences that they could be pursued 
rigorously. It is the purpose of this article to examine the FSA‟s record of 
enforcement relative to its estimated level of occurrence and the US experience.  
 
 
Insider dealing and Market Abuse: The UKs record on enforcement 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Insider dealing has been in the public spotlight recently. There was the dramatic dawn 
raid on sixteen addresses in the London area involving 143 officers from the Financial 
Services Authority (FSA) and others from the Serious Organised Crime Agency 
(SOCA) in March 2010 although as yet there have been no charges. There has also 
been the publication of two best sellers featuring a „front running‟ scheme (Moore, 
2009) and a „pump and dump‟ scheme (Faulks, 2010). It is interesting that, although 
both novels were supposed to be grounded in fact and representative of today‟s 
society and its values, they presented very different impressions of the FSA as 
regulators. 
 
Whilst the public is well aware of insider dealing and what it is, this may not be so 
with market abuse. Nevertheless, the two are intertwined and, in law, the former is a 
form of the latter. It is the purpose of this paper to examine the reality: how insider 
dealing and market abuse are related, how they are regulated, the law, the actual cases, 
both criminal and civil, and attempt to evaluate the performance of the FSA (the 
principal regulator since 2000) as it attempts to enforce the law and protect the 
markets from abuse. 
 
 
2. Insider dealing and market abuse: their basic forms,  
 
Insider dealing is the taking advantage of „inside information‟ by buying a security 
when on the release of that information its price will rise; alternatively, selling a 
security on the basis that when the inside information is released, its price will fall. 
Market abuse is a general term to describe actions by those involved in the markets 
(investors, brokers, financial advisers market makers, companies and their employees) 
that unfairly take advantage of other investors. Market abuse includes not only insider 
dealing but includes actions attempting to mislead the market, e.g. providing false 
information about a company‟s performance or giving a misleading impression of the 
market in the shares.  
 
In addition to simply buying or selling ahead of the release of new information such 
as a forthcoming takeover, profit warning or other announcement that will affect the 
price of a security, there are other „forms that insider dealing takes. 
Figure 1 
‘Pump and dump’ or share ‘ramping’. 
 
Figure 2 
‘Trash and cash’ 
  
‘Pump and dump’ and ‘trash and cash’. 
A person may attempt to make a profit by inflating a share price. This is known as 
„share ramping‟ or in the USA as „pump and dump‟. It may be done in a number of 
ways. The fraudster may try to influence the share price by broadcasting new 
information that will affect the share price. This may be done, for example on the 
Internet through a chat room, notice board or simply emailing investors. This news 
may or not be true - it doesn‟t matter. See Figure 1. The important point is not that the 
information is correct but that the market believes it – and a sufficient number of 
individuals believe it – to affect the share price.  If it is untrue, eventually the market 
will realize this and the share price will revert to what it was originally, as Figure 1 
shows. The fraudster, therefore, has two opportunities to make a profit. In addition to 
profiting from the pump, he could then short sell, use a CFD or a spread bet, to profit 
from the fall in the share price when the market realises that it has been misled.
i
 The 
main difficulty for the fraudster, is that the information may not have credibility and 
not enough people would be prepared to believe the information. Nevertheless, it may 
be achieved if the perpetrator is a journalist, as in the City Slickers case described 
later, or in an influential position in the City. 
 
The investor may also profit from „bad news‟ by „trash and cash‟, the opposite to 
„pump and dump‟. See Figure 2. Here, instead of releasing false good information to 
push up the share price, the investor releases false bad information (‟trashing‟ the 
company) to force it down. Again, the fraudster has two opportunities to make a profit. 
He may short sell
ii
, use a CFD or a spread bet, to profit from the fall in the share price. 
Later, he may buy at the artificially low price with a view to profiting from them 
when the market recognizes the information is wrong and the share price rights itself. 
Short selling and the spreading of rumours involving „trash and cash‟ schemes at the 
time of the credit crunch when the stock market became so volatile became the 
subject of so much criticism  that short selling of bank stocks was prohibited. 
Although there were rumours of „trash and cash‟ schemes and an investigation into 
share dealing in RBS, no evidence was found and no charges made. 
  
Front running  
This is the purchase or sale of a security on the basis of advance knowledge of a large 
purchase or sale that will affect the price. For example, an employee of a financial 
adviser buying shares knowing that a client will be purchasing a large block of shares 
in a few days‟ time.  
 
3. Why insider dealing and market abuse are crimes. 
 
In order to encourage investment and savings, it is in the public interest that investors 
are provided with reliable and trusted information. It is only then that they will be 
prepared to invest and businesses will be provided with the necessary funds and the 
money channelled into the most worthy areas. For this reason, the law and regulations 
relating to the informational aspects of the UK stock market are considered to be very 
important. Not only must the market be fair, it must be seen to be fair and no one 
should be seen to be at a disadvantage. Although individuals should be rewarded for 
making good decisions, they should not be able to profit from inside information, nor 
should they be able to manipulate financial.  
 It is sometimes said that market abuse and insider dealing are not immoral and they 
are victimless crimes. They are not; they are crimes both against society and 
individuals and are, therefore, morally wrong. A person who buys a stock because he 
has inside information that when it is released the share price will  rise, is defrauding 
the person who agrees to sell the shares but would not have agreed to sell at that price 
had he also been privy to that information.
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4. Who are the main perpetrators?  
 
The general view is that most of the insider dealing is done by those in the city with 
access to inside information in their professional capacity.  As long ago as 1987, The 
Financial Times (2 July) estimated that between a quarter and a half of all insider 
dealing is attributable to city firms acting as advisers. This estimate is unlikely to have 
changed. Barnes (1996) found that almost 75 per cent of the rise in a target‟s share 
price at the time of a bid occurs before its announcement. When this was analysed 
between bidders‟ advising merchant banks, it was found that this occurred 
significantly earlier in the case of two major advisory firms than others, suggesting 
their association with the leakage.  
 
Despite this, most of the cases that have come to the courts and have been 
successfully prosecuted are small, probably one-off instances. A director or a friend of 
his/her, say a secretary or assistant, acquires a piece of inside information, either good 
news  or bad news. He/she will invest if it‟s good news and sell when the information 
reaches the market and the share price rises. Typically, he/she does not „dabble in 
stocks and shares‟ and does not think to cover the transaction even though they 
probably know it‟s illegal. In most cases, they will not be discovered because so 
minor case making it difficult to trace. For such a transaction to be noticed, it must be 
a very large purchase or sale to affect the price and the volume of trading data or 
simply be so large or so perfectly timed as to appear suspicious. However, if the 
person is caught, it is usually obvious what has been happening as the individuals 
concerned have made no attempt to disguise or hide their share dealings. 
 
The City view and that of financial commentators is that at a particular point in time a 
number „rings‟ exist. Newspapers have from time to time even gone so far as stating a 
ring‟s name - but not those of the participants, of course. Typically, this would 
involve an individual (or a small group of individuals) who regularly have access to 
insider information, whether as members of corporate advisory teams advising on 
takeovers and mergers or even lower status employees with access to this information 
who pass it to a friend or relative or group of friends to invest. (The FSA has been 
critical of the unnecessarily large number of „insiders‟ involved and privy to 
confidential information on a typical deal in a financial institution, how the financial 
institution and its IT system attempt to keep the information secret (FSA, 2007)). 
However, because they are aware of the implications, rings ensure that their tracks are 
covered and it has been very rare for a ring to be discovered and successfully 
prosecuted. 
 
In a recent investigation by The Sunday Times, 6 June 2010, an acknowledged insider 
dealer described how rogue trading cells worked. ‟There is one insider [dealer] and 
then there‟s a number of people in the chain of information. The person who actually 
trades is a long way from the source. Each member of the chain has an incentive to 
keep quiet because they receive a cut of the illegal transaction. The more links in the 
chain, the more difficult it is to get caught. If you have some guy [trading] who is 
only tangentially connected or not connected at all [to the insider], how would the 
FSA know?‟ Another convicted insider dealer said offshore companies and bank 
accounts were ideal for disguising the money trail that leads to a trade – and for 
throwing the FSA off the scent. „You set up an offshore company in Belize, let‟s say, 
and maybe I use a bank in Malta or Gibraltar and I deal [in] the name of that company, 
there‟s no way they‟re going to find out who‟s behind that company‟. 
  
Two „rings‟ have been successfully prosecuted under the criminal legislation. 
 
Butt and others in 2004 
This case centres on a city professional, Asif Butt, former vice-president of 
compliance at Credit Suisse First Boston. Butt was found guilty of using confidential 
information about clients over a period of about three and a half years. Mr Butt 
worked in the secure zone of the bank known as the Compliance Control Room. This 
existed to ensure the secrecy of dealings. However, it gave Butt access to highly 
confidential inside information that was price sensitive relating to the status and 
performance of companies which the bank were advising.  Mr Butt fed the 
information to friends outside the bank, Ian Beale, Alexander Coleman, Richard 
Judson and Daniel Masters who either bought shares or placed spread bets of up to 
£600,000 before important financial announcements.19 transactions were presented at 
the trial. Seven involved advance knowledge of profits warnings and 12 concerned 
confidential information that a company was about to become the subject of a hostile 
bid or recommended takeover. Companies included Chubb, EMI and Johnson 
Matthey, Charter, Grantchester, Sedgwick and Royal Bank of Scotland‟s bid for 
NatWest. The friends used a schoolboy code in correspondence in which Butt was 
„The Walrus‟ and Masters „The Jackal‟. The total profits made were estimated at 
£388,488 and losses at £100,681, the net gain being £287,807 in which Butt‟s share 
was more than £237,000. It was claimed that as there were many other similar 
transactions not mentioned in court, the actual figure was probably much larger. 
Gray, Liggins, Rowlands and Riding in 1992 
David Gray was a stockbroker, William Liggins, a fund manager, Catherine 
Rowlands, an investment analyst, and Mark Riding, a fund manager. They were part 
of a „network of friends‟ ready and willing to pass insider information between 
themselves. They were charged in respect of two separate incidents in 1988. The first 
was the planned takeover of two cellular phone companies by the Hawthorn Leslie 
Group Plc. The second was the Australian group Goodman, Fielder, Wattie's bid for 
Rank Hovis McDougall. The case resulted from a DTI investigation into dealings in 
shares of Pleasurama, a leisure group, at a time when Mecca Leisure was making a 
takeover bid. The DTI said there had been many other highly suspicious dealings in 
Pleasurama shares and not all the individuals involved had been charged. 
 
However, more recently organised crime has been added to the list of likely 
perpetrators. In June 2010, the FSA warned of a new development - the targeting of 
insider dealing by organised crime and terrorists.
iv
 
 
5. The law, regulations: enforcement, prosecution and prevention 
 
The objective is for a fair market in a company‟s shares so that everyone has full and 
similar information on which to make buy, sell and hold decisions. In order to achieve 
this the period during which „price-sensitive‟ information exists but is not available to 
the general public is minimized. As a result, companies and their advisers have a 
major obligation to ensure that it is reported immediately and properly through a 
regulated information service.
v It is also unlawful to trade on inside information. 
 
5.1 Insider dealing as a criminal offence 
 
Insider dealing was not made unlawful in the UK until 1980 when under Part V of the 
Companies Act 1980 it became a criminal offence in certain specified circumstances. 
These provisions were later consolidated as the Company Securities (Inside dealing) 
Act 1985 („CSA‟) which was subsequently amended by the Financial Services Act 
1986. The CSA provisions were superseded by the Criminal Justice Act 1993, („CJA‟) 
which implemented the current EC Directive on Insider Dealing. The UK legislation 
has also been revised to incorporate the provisions of the 2003 European Directive on 
market abuse but it has not changed in any significant way, other than to extend the 
responsibility of the UK authorities to investigate individuals in the UK linked to 
market abuse conducted elsewhere in the EU.  
 
Under the CJA it is unlawful for an individual to deal in a security with inside 
information which, if it were made public, would be likely to have a significant effect 
on the price of the security. „Inside information‟ is defined by the CJA as information 
which relates to a particular security or a particular issuer of securities, is specific or 
precise, has not been made public; and, if it were made public, would have a 
significant impact on the share price, i.e. is price-sensitive.  
 
Most of the larger cases have been prosecuted under the CJA in conjunction with the 
Criminal Law Act 1977 Section 1 which makes it an offence to conspire to commit an 
act which would be a substantive offence in criminal law.  
 
Although it has yet to be used for this purpose, market abuse and insider dealing are 
also likely to be found unlawful under the Fraud Act 2006 which became law in 
January 2007 and the new general offence of fraud, which can be committed in three 
ways: by false representation, by failing to disclose information, and by abuse of 
position. The latter has particular relevance to market abuse and insider dealing as it 
states that a person is in breach of this section if he: occupies a position in which he is 
expected to safeguard, or not to act against, the financial interests of another person, 
dishonestly abuses that position, and intends, by means of the abuse of that position to 
(i) make a gain for himself or another, or (ii) cause loss to another or to expose 
another to a risk of loss. 
 
5.2 Market abuse as a criminal offence  
Market abuse is made a criminal offence under Section 397 of the Financial Services 
and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA‟) which replaced section 47(2) of the Financial 
Services Act 1986. Section 397 makes it unlawful for a person to (i) make a statement, 
promise or forecast which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive or (ii) 
dishonestly conceal any material facts whether in connection with a statement, 
promise or (iii) recklessly make (dishonestly or otherwise) a statement, promise or 
forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive.  
 
 
5.3 Insider dealing and market abuse as a civil offence 
 
The CJA largely failed as a deterrent because of its reliance on the criminal law 
(Stamp and Jaggers, 2005). This was recognized by Parliament when it introduced 
civil penalties for inside dealing as part of its market abuse regime under the FSMA. 
 
The FSMA extended the powers of regulators to combat market abuse and insider 
dealing as a form of market abuse. Section 118 of FSMA introduced two new civil 
offences of market manipulation: false or misleading impression and the distortion of 
the market. Here, it is unnecessary to show dishonest intention to commit market 
abuse. Negligent action or inaction may be sufficient. It is irrelevant where the 
behaviour occurred.  
 
Section 118 states that there are seven types of market abuse. These are listed in Table 
1. It also defines inside information (one of the seven types) in a slightly wider sense 
enabling prosecution under the civil law of cases falling just outside the criminal law, 
in addition, of course, to requiring a lower level of proof (balance of probabilities 
rather than beyond reasonable doubt).Inside information under the FSMA is defined 
as information of a „precise‟ nature (omitting the additional „specific‟ requirement 
under the CJA)which is not generally available, relates directly or indirectly to the 
security and, if the information were generally available, would have a significant 
effect on the security‟s price.  
 Table 1 
The Seven Types of Market Abuse 
 
1. Insider dealing 
2. Improper disclosure - of  inside information to another. 
3. Misuse of information  - behaviour based on information that 
is not generally available that would affect an investor‟s decision 
about the terms on which to deal 
4. Manipulating transactions  -trading, or placing orders, to give 
a false or misleading impression of the supply or demand for an 
investments, raising its price to an abnormal level 
5. Manipulating devices  - trading, or placing orders, which 
employ fictitious devices or any other form of deception or 
contrivance 
6. Dissemination - knowingly providing information that gives a 
misleading impression about an investment 
7. Distortion and misleading behaviour - to gives a misleading 
impression or distorts the market in an investment 
 
 
5.4 Preventative measures: The FSA’s controls  
 
Under FSMA 119, the FSA as the main UK regulator is required to produce a code. It is 
known as, „The Code of Market Conduct‟ and specifies behaviour amounting to market 
abuse. This is to be seen in terms of what the FSA calls „principles-based regulation‟ 
involving a set of broad principles, detailed rules resulting in various systems and 
controls that listed companies and advisory firms use and apply. 
 
Effectively, the controls place stringent obligations both on the company (referred to 
as the „issuer‟) and the financial advisers etc referred to as „firms‟). Under the „Listing 
Rules‟, a listed company must notify a Regulatory Information Service („RIS‟) of any 
major or significant developments that are not already public knowledge and affect its 
financial position or expectations of its future performance that would lead to a 
movement in its share price.
vi
 (The Listing Rules were traditionally set by the London 
Stock Exchange itself but are now administered by the FSA and effectively have the 
force of law). In certain situations, the issuer is allowed a short delay in making an 
announcement in order to clarify the situation when it is faced with an unexpected and 
significant event.  
 
In respect of firms, the FSA attempts to ensure that inside information is properly 
managed and leaks prevented. Although the Code does not necessarily specify how, it 
is concerned that insider lists are properly maintained, information barriers are 
reasonable, information technology is secure, document access is secure and 
procedures are in place workable and effective and for Chinese Walls to be effective 
they should at least be geographically separated. There should be formal procedures 
in place for passing information to third parties. The FSA‟s „Principles for Approved 
Persons‟ also relate to market conduct by firms. These require an approved person to 
act with due skill, care and diligence and apply proper standards of conduct. The FSA 
also requires firms to submit suspicious transaction reports (STR) if it believes there 
are reasonable grounds for suspecting a transaction involves market abuse. The FSA 
operates a computer system known as Sabre (Surveillance Analysis of Business 
Reporting) which includes a database of market transactions collected from 
authorized firms, regulated investment exchanges and settlement systems. It has 
recently developed Sabre II which has the ability to collect and analyze end-of-day 
transaction reports from investment firms.  
 Table 2 
 
Criminal Cases for Insider Dealing since it became an offence 
 
 
Year 
Cases ‘Ring’ Adviser 
or 
Inform-
ation 
from an 
adviser 
Director Information 
from a 
director 
Information 
 from a 
Regulator 
1981 2  1 1   
1982 1  1    
1986 1   1   
1987 2  1  1  
1988 1   1   
1989 3  1 1  1 
1990 2    2  
1991 1    1  
1992 1 1     
1994 1  1    
1995 1  1    
1996 1  1    
2001 
1     1 
2003 1  1    
2004 
2 1   1  
2009 2  2    
2010 2  2    
Total 
26 2 13 4 5 2 
 5.5 Criminal cases of insider dealing 
As Table 2 shows, 15 of the 26 cases relate to the fraudster either being a financial 
adviser or acting on information from an adviser as the two cases involving „rings‟ 
described earlier also centred on advisers. Three other cases are of particular interest. 
Smith, Spearman, Spearman, and Payne 
In January 2004, three of the defendants were found guilty of conspiracy to commit 
insider dealing. Payne worked as a proof-reader at a firm of commercial printers 
where he saw drafts of prospectuses and offer documents prior to the announcement 
of a bid on the LSE. He passed this information on to the other defendants, who were 
not city professionals but business people working outside London, who bought 
shares. 27 takeover or merger transactions were presented at the trial. Profits earned 
by the defendants amounted to a total of £336,000. Because of its size, the case was 
investigated and prosecuted by the Serious Fraud Office. The case was also 
significant for the use of telephone tapping by the investigators. 
Porter and Daw  
Although this was a small case, it is interesting because it was perpetrated by 
regulators. Stephen Porter and Julian Daw were employees of the London Stock 
exchange (LSE) in its Companies Announcements office handling price-sensitive 
information about listed companies before releasing them via the Regulatory News 
Service (RNS).  
In July 1997, Mr Porter received information concerning merger talks between 
Capital Transport Rental Group (CTR) and General Electric Capital Corporation. He 
passed that information on to Mr Daw before putting out an announcement on the 
RNS. Mr Daw, who no longer worked for the LSE at the time, then passed the 
information on to a third party who arranged for shares in CTR to be acquired. The 
shares were sold the next day for a profit of £6,000, although there was no evidence 
that Mr Porter or Mr Daw profited from the sale. In November 1997, the process was 
repeated in relation to a potential takeover of Faber Prest but there was not enough 
time to buy shares before the announcement was made. 
 
Calvert  
Malcolm Calvert was a partner at Cazenove who received information from a mole at 
the firm on forthcoming deals. He passed on the information to a friend, Bert Hatcher, 
who bought shares in various companies about to be the subject of a takeover. 
Hatcher received immunity from prosecution in return for giving evidence against 
Calvert, a significant policy development.  
 
5.6 Criminal cases of market abuse 
 
There have been two cases (the AIT prosecuted by the FSA and the City Slickers case 
prosecuted by the DTI) since 1986 when it became an offence. Both of these occurred 
in 2005 and in both cases the five individuals concerned were found guilty, four of 
whom went to jail.  
 AIT  
 
This case involved recklessly making a statement to the market which was misleading. 
AIT was a software design company listed on the LSE. On 2 May 2002, AIT issued a 
trading statement which reported that its turnover and profit were going to be in line 
with the market‟s expectation of £47m and £6.7m, respectively. This included 
revenue and £4.8m of profit from three contracts that had not yet been entered into so 
as to legally bind the parties which under normal accounting practice should not have 
been included. On 31 May 2002 an update was issued stating that the 2 May statement 
was no longer accurate because one of the contracts had not been confirmed, leading 
to a £1.1m shortfall in revenue and profit. The statement also noted that short term 
cash requirements were unlikely to be covered by AIT's current borrowing facilities 
and other cash resources. All this caused the share price to fall from 492.5p to 96.5p. 
On 13 June 2002 a further statement was issued announcing that AIT would not 
publish preliminary results that day because of issues that had arisen in the company's 
audit and that there would be a further shortfall in revenue and profit. The share price 
fell further from 105p to 38.5p. Following the announcements, the company was 
forced to restructure and seek new finance. Its CEO and CFO were charged with 
recklessly making a statement, promise or forecast which was misleading, false or 
deceptive contrary to the market abuse regulations in Section 397 of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000. In August 2005 both were found guilty and AIT‟s 
CEO at the time, Carl Rigby, was sent to jail.  
 
City Slickers 
 
This case involved two journalists and a friend operating what was effectively a 
„pump and dump‟ scheme. James Hipwell and Anil Bhoyrul were financial journalists 
employed by The Daily Mirror to write a regular column entitled „City Slickers‟. The 
column was devoted to reporting rumours and making recommendations to readers to 
buy and sell shares based on these. They discovered that the column was widely read 
and influential to such an extent that as a result of a tip, the share price invariably rose. 
They started buying shares prior to the tip appeared in their column contravening both 
the journalistic code and the law. 
 
Table 3 
 
Civil Cases for Market Abuse since it became an offence 
 
Year Cases The Seven Types of Market Abuse Contrary 
To FSA 
Principles 
  Insider 
Dealing 
Improper 
Disclosure 
Misuse of 
Information 
Manipulating 
transactions 
Manipulating  
Devices 
Dissemination Distortion 
& 
misleading 
behaviour 
2003 1    1     
2004 8 3 1    2 1 1 
2005 5 3   1    1 
2006 4 2 1      1 
2007 2  1      1 
2008 4 3 1       
2009 7 5 1      1 
2010 6 3     1 2  
Total 37 19 5 0 2 0 3 3 5 
 5.7 Civil cases of market abuse 
As Table 3 shows, half of the cases relate to insider dealing offences, most of which 
(but not all)
vii
 for whatever reason could not have been prosecuted as criminal cases. 
For example, Arif Mohammed was an employee of PricewaterhouseCoopers and a 
member of its Delta plc audit team. In November 2002 he obtained confidential 
information that Delta intended to sell its electrical division and on 29 November 
2002 he bought shares in Delta. The sale of the electrical division was announced on 
10 December 2002 whereupon Mr. Mohammed sold his shares, making a profit of 
£3,750. 
The largest case is that of Shell. A £17m fine was imposed on Shell as a result of, 
what was described as „unprecedented misconduct‟ in relation to misstatements of its 
proved reserves. When Shell first publicly revealed on 9 January 2004 that it had 
misstated its reserves, its share price fell 7.5 per cent, from 401p to 371p, reducing its 
market capitalisation by approximately £2.9bn. A number of factors made Shell's 
abuse of the market particularly serious. It had made false or misleading 
announcements in relation to its hydrocarbon reserves and reserves replacement ratios 
between 1998 and 2003. These announcements were made despite indications and 
warnings from 2000 to 2003 that they were false or misleading. Shell did not correct 
the information it had disclosed until the publication of its results for the period 9 
January to 24 May 2004 when it announced the re-categorisation of 4,470 million 
barrels of oil equivalent, approximately 25 per cent of its proved reserves.  
Table 4 
Penalties imposed by FSA for Breaches of Listing Rules 
Year Cases Fine 
2003 2 Both censured 
2004 2* Companies: censured and £90,000 
Individuals: £45,000,£10,000 
2005 3 £450,000, £240,000,Censured 
2008 1 £350,000 
2009 2 £140,000, £245,000 
 10   
 
 *2 companies plus, in each case, an individual. 
 
5.8 Penalties imposed by FSA for breaches of the listing rules 
Since 2003, there have been ten cases. See Table 4. These relate to instances where a 
company has failed to inform the market of information likely to affect its share price. 
For example, the FSA fined Wolfson Microelectronics plc £140,000 for breach of the 
Listing Rules for a delay of 16 days in announcing inside information to the 
market.  On 10 March 2008, Wolfson was informed by a major customer that it no 
longer required Wolfson to supply it with parts for its product.  Wolfson estimated 
that the loss of the contract would amount to a loss of $20 million (8% of its forecast 
revenue for 2008) but it did not announce the negative news until 27 March 2008.  
  
6. The frequency of occurrence and likelihood of discovery of insider dealing and 
market abuse 
 
There have been few estimates of the extent of insider dealing and the probability of 
prosecution. The most authoritative is certainly that of the Trade and Industry 
Committee report to the House of Commons on 2 May 1990. It stated that since May 
1988 the LSE had conducted about 240 investigations into possible insider dealing 
cases and had passed about two a month to the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI). Between 1985 and 1990, 101 cases had been transferred in this way, inspectors 
being appointed in 41 cases which resulted in 19 prosecutions and ten convictions. 
But that was a long time ago and there was no estimate of the number of cases that 
had gone unnoticed or were so small as not to merit an investigation. 
 
Now that there is a reporting system of suspicious transactions, this is possible. 
Between 2005, when the system began, and June 2010, there have been 1,485 STRs, 
although the majority did not trigger an investigation.
viii
 On the basis that since then 
seven individuals (in three cases) have been found guilty of insider dealing, the 
chances of discovery and criminal conviction are one in 200. 
 
The FSA has attempted to provide an estimate the amount of insider dealing at the 
time of a merger announcement (Dubow and Monteiro, 2006). They examined the 
share price change in excess of that which would be expected from the change in the 
market as a whole, around the date of the announcement - the pre-announcement 
window (two trading days prior to the day of announcement) and the post-
announcement window (the day of announcement and the next trading day). Dubow 
and Monteiro called these informed price movements (IPM). They then computed a 
„market cleanliness index‟ as the total number of announcements in which a 
statistically significant IPMs had occurred as a percentage of the total number of 
announcements in which there had been a statistically significant price change (SA), 
i.e. IPM/SA. Between 2000 and 2005, Dubow and Monteiro found that between a 
third and a quarter of all merger bids involved statistically significant price changes 
immediately prior to their announcement. For a significant pre-announcement 
abnormal performance to occur, there must have been some degree of insider dealing, 
possibly a considerable amount to eventually affect the share price. However, what is 
disturbing is that the study probably understates this occurrence for takeovers and 
mergers because it is using such a short window. A period of two days is clearly 
insufficient to measure the total share price adjustment prior to a merger 
announcement. 
 
My own studies (Barnes, 1996, 2009) have used a much wider window, two months 
prior to the announcement. I found that share prices of target firms increased by 31 
per cent over the period 2 months before the announcement to 1 month afterwards (it 
is usual for a premium of 30% to be offered to targets) and 23 per cent (almost three 
quarters of the total movement) occurred before the announcement. Further, there 
were significant price changes in more than 90% of the cases. In other words, rather 
than between a quarter and a third of merger announcements involve a significant 
share price movement prior to the announcement, implying insider dealing, when a 
wider window is examined, this occurs in almost every case.  
 Dubow and Monteiro also studied FTSE 350 companies‟ regulatory disclosures, 
trading announcements under such headings as “trading statement”, “trading update”, 
“contract award” or “drilling report”. They showed that IPMs also occurred. These 
results are in line with two other unpublished studies of relating to profit warning 
announcements by Bulkley and Herrerias (2002) and Bulkley et al (2002) who found 
a significant amount of abnormal share price performance during the five days prior 
to the warning announcement.  
 
Generalising from these empirical studies, assuming that there are about 150 takeover 
bids a year and about 50 profit warnings (these will, of course vary considerably 
according to economic conditions) and if on average there are five people trading on 
inside information
ix
, this means there are 1,000 instances of insider dealing a year. 
This compares with on average between one and two criminal prosecutions per year. 
The chances of being caught are, therefore, one in 500 at least.    
 
There are no similar estimates of the extent of market abuse. However, if the number 
of criminal and civil cases is indicative, whilst it may not be so common, it may have 
a serious impact. 
 
7. How well has the law been enforced? 
 
Although insider dealing was made unlawful as long ago as 1980 in the UK, it was 
not until 2000 and the passing of the FSMA and the creation of the civil option and 
the formation of the FSA as the principal regulator that it and market abuse could be 
pursued rigorously. Since then, the FSA has been the principal prosecutor and, with 
just two exceptions, been responsible for the investigation and prosecution of most of 
the civil cases. Although, before 2000 many of the cases brought (mainly by the DTI 
as the principal enforcing agency) failed, the FSA has been successful in all but one of 
the criminal cases
x
 it has brought to court. 
 
The general impression is that insider dealing and market abuse have not been 
eliminated over the last decade but probably continue at a similarly high rate as ever. 
They are now also seen as symptoms of the malaise in the markets over the period 
leading up to and during the 2007-9 financial crisis. Nevertheless, perpetrators must 
now be more aware of the real risks they take. Even though probabilistically these 
may be slight, the penalties are high, involving imprisonment in most of the criminal 
cases and high fines in the civil cases. On top of these are the disgrace and loss of 
career.  
 
The criticism of the FSA‟s record is not just that there have been relatively few cases, 
but that it has failed to catch a large ring or a perpetrator operating on a grand scale. 
Regarding the first: over the last five years, there have been just seven criminal 
convictions in the UK for insider dealing (plus five more for other forms of market 
abuse) whilst in the US there were 534. Whilst the US stock market is larger, it is not 
that much larger. The market value of stocks on the NYSE is $12 trillion compared 
with $2.4 trillion on the LSE. Regarding the second, in the US there have been a 
number of large cases, beginning with Ivan Boesky who was fined $100m and 
sentenced to 42 months and Ebbers at WorldCom who was sentenced to 25 years. The 
most recent is that of Joseph Naccio, former CEO of Qwest Communications who 
was fined $71m and jailed for six years. The longest UK prison sentence has been 30 
months. 
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i
 A contract for difference (CFD) is a contract designed to make a profit or avoid a 
loss by reference to movements in the price of a stock. The stock is not bought or sold 
itself. Spread betting is a type of gambling that may be done with a specialist firm 
where the punter bets that a stock will rise or fall by a specified amount. 
 
ii
 Short selling involves borrowing shares, selling them to a third party, then buying 
them back when the price falls. Financial institutions holding securities are often 
prepared to lend shares in this way for a commission. 
 
iii
 For instance in the AIT case described later, it was argued and a number of fund 
managers were presented as witnesses to show, how they had made investment 
decisions based on the misleading information and as a result their funds (which 
included public pension funds) had incurred large losses. 
iv
 The connections between organised crime, terrorists and insider dealing are not new. 
It was reported in The Sunday Times, 18 September 2001 that the CIA had asked the 
FSA to help investigate the short selling of an unusually large number of shares in 
airlines, insurance companies and arms manufacturers immediately before the terrorist 
attacks in the World Trade Centre in New York. The price of the shares dropped 
dramatically after the attack, enabling the short sellers to make millions of dollars. If 
the CIA could have traced the short sellers who had acting on the inside information 
of the forthcoming attack, this could have led them to the terrorists. 
                                                                                                                                      
v
 For example, in September 2009, the FSA fined Mark Lockwood, a former trading 
desk manager at a retail stockbroking firm, £20,000 for failing to observe proper 
standards of market conduct.  Lockwood failed to identify and act on a suspicious 
client order that allowed the firm to be used to facilitate insider dealing.   
 
vi
 A RIS is an organisation or firm through which listed companies can release their 
regulatory announcements. Since 2002 listed companies have had a choice of RIS 
bringing to an end to the LSE's monopoly for the release of information through its 
own Regulatory News Service. 
 
vii
  See Footnote v above. 
 
viii
 „Rogue traders cash in as watchdog flounders‟, The Sunday Times, 6 June, 2010. 
 
ix
 This estimate is based on the belief that there is a significant of insider dealing so as 
affect the company‟s share price in almost every case. 
 
x
  The case of King, McFall and Rimmington in 2010. 
